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A B S T R A C T
International Commissions of Inquiry (COIs) have become important components of the
human rights fact-finding, accountability and transitional justice architecture. The core task
of COIs is to investigate international crises and construe what happened on the ground.
The increasing tendency of states under scrutiny to refuse territorial access frustrates COI
performance. It leaves COIs with no option but to operate from outside the state. COIs
have developed various strategies to overcome the impediment of the uncooperative state,
including the use of satellite imagery, conducting extraterritorial public hearings, interviewing
individuals in the territory through Skype and other media as well as collecting accounts
from individuals in the diaspora. This article focuses on the engagement of COIs with the
diaspora. It presents diasporas as actors that may have considerable significance for COIs in
a variety of ways, beyond sharing information. The article unveils the distinct roles that dia-
sporic actors may entertain vis-à-vis international inquiries, as subjects in need of protection,
information providers, and audience and mobilization forces. Looking at the COI for
Eritrea, the article tests how these different roles play out in practice and how they inter-
relate. It thus sheds light on the capacity of COIs to make a difference extraterritorially for
individuals in the diaspora, and on the capacity of diasporic actors to influence COI findings
and shape follow up. The Eritrean COI experience illustrates that a purely instrumental ap-
proach towards diasporas – one which only regards diasporas as sources of information and
which fails to protect extraterritorially or tap into the greater potential of diaspora mobiliza-
tion – lessens COI effectivity for broader human rights and transitional justice purposes.
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The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has been particularly active in establish-
ing COIs and related fact-finding bodies. The core task of those COIs is to investi-
gate international crises and thus to construe what happened on the ground.
Paradoxically though, the tendency of states under scrutiny to refuse territorial access
and cooperation more broadly seems to be on the rise. This leaves COIs with no op-
tion but to operate from outside the state. COIs have developed various strategies to
overcome the impediment of the uncooperative state,2 including the use of satellite
imagery, conducting extraterritorial public hearings, interviewing individuals in the
territory through Skype and other media as well as collecting first-hand accounts
from individuals in the diaspora.
This article explores the engagement of COIs with the diaspora. As overseas polit-
ical communities, diasporas may have considerable significance for COIs, something
that has been largely ignored so far, in particular by international lawyers. The main
purpose of this article is therefore to unveil the distinct roles that diasporic actors
may entertain vis-à-vis international inquiries. Using Eritrea as a case study, it
presents diasporic actors and identifies their three potentially different roles in the
COI fact-finding process – as subjects of protection, information providers and mo-
bilization forces. The article tests how these different roles play out in practice and
how they interrelate. It thus sheds light on the capacity of COIs to make a difference
extraterritorially for individuals in the diaspora as well as on the capacity of diasporic
actors to influence COI findings and to shape follow up. The Eritrean COI experi-
ence illustrates that a purely instrumental approach towards diasporas – one which
only regards diasporas as sources of information and which fails to protect extraterri-
torially or tap into the greater potential of diaspora mobilization – lessens COI ef-
fectivity for broader human rights and transitional justice purposes.
H O W D I A S P O R A S D O N O T F I T I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W ’ S
C H E S S B O A R D S Q U A R E S
In her book The Chess-Board and the Web, Anne-Marie Slaughter invites readers to
look at the world in stereo – to see it as a chessboard composed of 190+ separated
squares that represent states and simultaneously to have a webview of the world, see-
ing it as a map of connections that ignore national borders.3 The networked view
goes beyond states and highlights the role of transnational actors, or web actors, on
the global stage of international politics, law and justice. Slaughter laments that for-
eign policy makers still see the world through Westphalian glasses,4 and the same
may of course be said for international lawyers. While international lawyers are famil-
iar with the concept of nonstate actors, this tends to be confined to a limited cat-
egory of relatively fixed entities such as corporations, armed opposition groups and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)/civil society. Diasporas are generally an
2 C. Harwood, ‘Navigating between Principle and Pragmatism: The Roles and Functions of Atrocity-Related
United Nations Commissions of Inquiry in the International Legal Order’ (PhD thesis, Leiden University,
2018). Also see, Dan Saxon, ‘Purpose and Legitimacy in International Fact-Finding Bodies,’ in Quality
Control in Fact-Finding, ed. Morten Bergsmo (Florence: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2013).
3 A.-M. Slaughter, The Chess-Board and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2017).
4 Ibid.
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unknown category for international lawyers.5 The limited attention devoted to diaspo-
ras from legal angles has so far mostly focused on citizenship questions and political
rights, in particular the question of extraterritorial voting.6 In contrast, other disciplines
do recognize the increasing significance of diasporas, also in international justice proc-
esses and transnational relations more broadly.7 Indeed, diasporas as transnational so-
cial movements or distinct political communities are studied from different angles in
different disciplines, including international relations, sociology and anthropology, and
have even generated their own subdiscipline of diaspora studies. Yet, the relatively new
scholarship on the role of diasporas in international justice processes and human rights
and international criminal law mechanisms that emerges in adjacent disciplines8 has
not yet been complemented much by legal or sociolegal analysis.9
Diasporas have probably largely remained beyond the horizon of international law-
yers because they are not easily shoehorned into international law’s subject-based ap-
proach. In fact, diasporas challenge the core of international lawyers’ conceptual
framework. They are, as such, quite a dramatic invitation to lawyers to consider a
‘post-subject framework of analysis.’10 As diasporic citizens are likely to become key fig-
ures of global modernity,11 international lawyers might not be able to perpetuate their
blind spot. They will, at some point, have to take on the challenge and find ways to
grapple with this newly empowered phenomenon, including revisiting structures that
have impeded this embrace so far. It is thus submitted that legal actors and scholars
operating in the areas of human rights and international criminal law cannot continue
to disregard diasporas just because they do not fit their boxes and approaches. As a first
step, this article offers a diasporic perspective on COIs, using Eritrea as a case study.
J U S T I F Y I N G T H E C A S E S T U D Y A N D I N T R O D U C I N G
T H E E R I T R E A N D I A S P O R A
The Eritrean COI is obviously not the only one that has been confronted with dias-
pora issues and pressures.12 Nonetheless, it is considered particularly useful as a case
5 But see, A. Chander, ‘Diaspora Bonds,’ New York University Law Review 76 (2001): 1005–1099; A. Addis,
‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the Diaspora,’ Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law 45 (2012): 963–1041; P. Shah, ‘Diasporas as Legal Actors: Implications for
Established Legal Boundaries,’ Non-State Actors and International Law 5(2) (2005): 153–165.
6 See, e.g., F. Mégret and R. Girard, ‘Diasporas, Extraterritorial Representation, and the Right to Vote,’
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 52 (2015): 185–221.
7 See, e.g., M. Koinova, ‘Diaspora Mobilisation for Conflict and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Contextual
and Comparative Dimensions,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(8) (2018): 1251–1269; C.
Orjuela, ‘Mobilising Diasporas for Justice: Opportunity Structures and the Presencing of a Violent Past,’
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(8) (2018): 1357–1373, as well as other contributions in the
symposium of that journal issue.
8 See, e.g., Koinova, supra n 7; E. Wiebelhaus-Brahm, ‘Exploring Variation in Diasporas’ Engagement with
Transitional Justice Processes,’ Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 11(3) (2016): 23–36.
9 But see, F. Mégret, ‘The “Elephant in the Room” in Debates about Universal Jurisdiction: Diasporas,
Duties of Hospitality, and the Constitution of the Political,’ Transnational Legal Theory 6(1) (2015): 89–
116.
10 K. Knop, ‘Lorimer’s Private Citizens of the World,’ European Journal of International Law 27(2) (2016):
475.
11 V. Bernal, Nation as Network: Diaspora, Cyberspace and Citizenship (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 2014).
12 See, e.g., ‘4,000 Tamils Protest in Geneva for Sri Lanka War Crimes Probe,’ Arab News, 11 March 2014.
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study for this inquiry because of the unique diasporic features of the state of Eritrea.
As noted by Victoria Bernal, the Eritrean nation was founded on diasporic linkages.13
After the war with Ethiopia ended in 1991 and in the run-up to the independence
referendum, Eritreans worldwide – who had been Ethiopian citizens when they left –
were offered Eritrean national identity cards allowing them to vote.14 Ever since,
Eritrea has retained its transnational orientation and has consolidated its rule over
exiled communities.15 Although numbers are contested, claims have surfaced that
one-third of the Eritrean population lives abroad.16 Given this sizeable number of
overseas Eritreans, it has been argued that there are, in fact, two types of Eritreas:
Eritrea ‘proper’ and Eritrea ‘diaspora.’17
Eritrea’s diaspora is not only substantial relative to the inhabitants of Eritrea as
well as spread over different foreign countries; it is also heterogeneous. The diaspora
is composed of different generations that migrated from Eritrea in phases,18 each
period relating to a different time in Eritrea’s political history.19 Each generation and
at times also their offspring hold a distinct range of beliefs in relation to their home
country, largely determined by the political conditions at the moment of departure.20
The first generation includes migrants from the 1960s up to the end of the 1980s –
migrants who thus left as Ethiopians before Eritrea gained independence. The major-
ity of those members of the diaspora community originally identified themselves
strongly with the leader of the liberation movement and the Eritrean Peoples’
Liberation Front (EPLF), Isaias Afwerki.21 Afwerki became president at
13 Bernal, supra n 11.
14 Ibid., making the claim for Eritrea’s moment of independence. See, for a similar claim made in 2008,
T.M.R. Hepner, ‘Transnational Governance and the Centralization of State Power in Eritrea and Exile,’
Ethnic and Racial Studies 31(3) (2008): 476–502.
15 Hepner, supra n 14.
16 Ibid.; Bernal, supra n 11.
17 D.R. Mekonnen, ‘The Case for Crimes against Humanity in Eritrea: Assessing the Reports of the Two
UN Fact Finding Missions,’ Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 7(2) (2016): 221–256.
On Eritrea as a diasporic state, see also, R. Iyob, ‘The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs.
Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991–2000,’ Journal of Modern African Studies 38(4) (2000):
659–682.
18 Cf. T.R. Hepner, ‘Generation Nationalism and Generation Asylum: Eritrean Migrants, the Global
Diaspora, and the Transnational Nation-State,’ Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 18(1–2)
(2015): 184–207.
19 The diaspora is also fragmented along regional, ethnic and religious lines. A.S. Mohammad and K.
Tronvoll, ‘Eritrean Opposition Parties and Civic Organisations,’ NOREF Expert Analysis (January 2015).
Also see, P.A. Hoyle, ‘The Eritrean National Identity: A Case Study,’ North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation 24(2) (1999): 381–416.
20 T.M.R. Hepner, ‘Militarization, Generational Conflict, and the Eritrean Refugee Crisis,’ in African
Childhoods: Education, Development, Peacebuilding, and the Youngest Continent, ed. M.O. Ensor (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). But also see Belloni, who detects the ambivalence of Eritreans in their
attitude towards their homeland, oscillating between patriotism and disenchantment corresponding with
their multiple social roles. M. Belloni, ‘Refugees and Citizens: Understanding Eritrean Refugees’
Ambivalence towards Homeland Politics,’ International Journal of Comparative Sociology 60(1–2) (2019):
55–73.
21 A number of migrants during this period were members of the defeated Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
militia, from which the EPLF grew, and whom the EPLF eventually defeated and effectively exiled in a de
facto ‘civil war.’ These migrants would not identify themselves with the EPLF, although they would iden-
tify with the liberation movement more generally. See generally, D.R. Mekonnen, Transitional Justice:
Framing a Model for Eritrea (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr Müller, 2009).
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independence and has been ever since, while the EPLF transformed into the
People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the country’s ruling party.22 The
children of these first-generation migrants are organized in a special youth movement
of the PFDJ, called the Youth PFDJ or YPFDJ, also maintaining strong ties to
Asmara – Eritrea’s capital and most populous city.23
Under Afwerki’s leadership, self-reliance became one of the core principles guiding
the PFDJ and, thus, the state.24 Registration for 18 months of national service began
for all citizens aged between 18 and 40, with a view to building a force to defend and
rebuild the country,25 and elections were indefinitely postponed on national security
grounds.26 Eritrea’s continuing struggles with Ethiopia escalated to a full-fledged bor-
der war from 1998 to 2000. This altered Eritrea’s political trajectory and left state insti-
tutions to atrophy while the PFDJ resumed its posture as a fighting front.27 Eritrea as a
garrison state28 can thus be understood as a continuation of the EPLF military liber-
ation movement, under the absolute power of President Afwerki and his three trusted
advisors, with the almost total absence of rule of law.29 Political opponents questioned
Afwerki’s leadership, which led to a complete political crackdown. The second gener-
ation of migrants are those who fled the country during the war with Ethiopia and in
its aftermath, when a clampdown on all democratic institutions, the press, the media
and independent organizations was realized,30 and mandatory conscription into nation-
al service became a permanent feature.31 A culture of fear dominates segments of the
diaspora, in part because the PFDJ holds an iron grip, especially in places with a large
diaspora population, using spy networks composed of more loyal first-wave migrants.32
Informants are used to collect information on second-wave members of the Eritrean
diaspora, and critics of the Eritrean government do not receive assistance from the
Eritrean embassy. The ultimate retaliation includes denial of family reunions, penaliz-
ing family members still residing in Eritrea, voidance of inheritance rights, threat of de-
tention and denial of exit visas in cases of return to Eritrea.33 The second migration
22 On the blurring between the PFDJ and the state of Eritrea, also see, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on
Somalia and Eritrea,’ UN Doc. S/2011/433 (18 July 2011), para. 367.
23 On fundraising and mobilization by the PFDJ in the diaspora through youth conferences and other
events, see, ibid., paras. 388–390.
24 UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), para. 105.
25 Ibid., para. 106.
26 See generally, G. Kibreab, Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War of Independence: Social Capital,
Associational Life, Religion, Ethnicity and Sowing Seeds of Dictatorship (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2008).
27 UN Doc. S/2011/433 (18 July 2011), para. 256.
28 K. Tronvoll and D.R. Mekonnen, The African Garrison State: Human Rights and Political Development in
Eritrea (London: James Currey, 2014).
29 For an analysis of power structures and internal political dynamics in Eritrea, see, M. Plaut, Understanding
Eritrea: Inside Africa’s Most Repressive State (London: Hurst Publishers, 2017); ‘Report of the Monitoring
Group,’ UN Doc. S/2013/440 (25 July 2013), paras. 9–25. For a more positive appraisal of the situation
in Eritrea, see, for example, B. Bruton, ‘It’s Bad in Eritrea, but Not That Bad,’ New York Times, 23 June
2016.
30 UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.1 (8 June 2016), para. 60.
31 UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), paras. 1172–1397.
32 D. Bozzini,’ The Fines and the Spies: Fears of State Surveillance in Eritrea and in the Diaspora,’ Social
Analysis 59(4) (2015): 32–49. Also see, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), para. 340.
33 ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea,’ UN Doc. S/2012/545 (13 July 2012), para. 91
and Annex 3.1.







niversiteit Leiden / LU
M
C
 user on 04 D
ecem
ber 2019
wave is still ongoing. Today, it consists particularly of young people fleeing the con-
tinuing policy of open-ended national service.34 Stringent measures aimed at curbing
the exodus include a shoot-to-kill policy,35 thereby also creating the conditions in
which members of the military, especially the Border Control Authority, are able to ex-
ploit the desperation of prospective refugees to expand a trade of illegal smuggling and
human trafficking (Sinai trafficking), with Eritrean refugees held captive for ransom in
Egypt, Sudan and Libya, among other countries.36
Although these migration waves point to substantial intergenerational and polit-
ical differences, there are also similarities in how members of the different genera-
tions are treated by their home state. Eritrea pursues active diaspora policies with
significant financial dimensions treating the diaspora as some kind of ‘offshore citi-
zens.’37 Key components of this policy include: collecting diaspora taxes,38 fundrais-
ing at specially organized social and political diaspora events and illicit revenue
generated through human smuggling and trafficking.39 In addition to generating eco-
nomic revenue, Eritrea’s ‘tentacular [extraterritorial] governance’ also aims to export
fear to diaspora communities and to colonize social relations abroad.40 Eritrea state
control thus transcends its national borders in very critical ways.41
E S T A B L I S H M E N T A N D M A N D A T E O F T H E C O I E F R O M
A D I A S P O R I C P E R S P E C T I V E
Eritrea’s repressive internal policies contributed to the country becoming one of the
greatest migrant-generating states in the world, despite its relatively small population.
Western states largely bore the consequences of the policies of Eritrea’s regime in
the form of an ever-greater influx of asylum seekers. This led to the tabling of the
matter at the UNHRC and the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry for
Eritrea (COIE).42 Yet, as illustrated in this section, although the exodus of Eritreans
may have been a factor leading to the establishment of the COIE, its mandate did
not extend to scrutinizing their wellbeing.
34 International Crisis Group, ‘Eritrea: Ending the Exodus?’ Briefing No. 100/Africa (8 August 2014).
35 According to this policy, there is a standing instruction to shoot and kill anyone illegally crossing the bor-
der. UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), paras. 1111–1116.
36 M. van Reisen and M. Mawere, eds., Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era: The Ongoing
Tragedy of the Trade in Refugees from Eritrea (Bamenda: Langaa, 2017).
37 This term is borrowed from Bernal, supra n 11 at chap. 1.
38 This extraterritorial income tax of two percent is also called the development and rehabilitation tax and
payment is a precondition for government services such as passport renewal or issuance of a visa, services
related to family reunification and inheritance matters. UN Doc. S/2012/545 (13 July 2012), paras. 87–
99. Also see, S. Tecle and L. Goldring, ‘From “Remittance” to “Tax”: The Shifting Meanings and
Strategies of Capture of the Eritrean Transnational Party-State,’ African and Black Diaspora: An
International Journal 6(2) (2013): 189–207.
39 These practices were detailed in reports of the Sanctions Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea,
established by the UN Security Council. See, UN Docs. S/2011/433 (18 July 2011), S/2012/545 (13
July 2012), S/2013/440 (25 July 2013), S/2014/727 (15 October 2014), S/2015/802 (20 October
2015), S/2016/920 (31 October 2016).
40 Bozzini, supra n 32 at 44.
41 Ibid.
42 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/HRC/29/42 (4 June 2015), para. 155, noting the number of near 50,000 asylum
seekers leaving Eritrea in 2015, rendering Eritrea the fifth largest generator of asylum seekers that year.
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The COIE was established by the UNHRC on 14 June 2014 with a mandate
‘to investigate all alleged violations of human rights in Eritrea, as outlined in
the reports of the Special Rapporteur.’43 The COIE interpreted this mandate as
follows:
Competence ratione personae: the Commission shall only investigate alleged
violations that are imputable on Eritrean authorities. This means violations dir-
ectly committed by Eritrean public officials; committed at their instigation or
with their consent or acquiescence; or when the relevant authorities have
abstained to prevent, investigate and prosecute authors of violations of the fun-
damental rights of a person.
Competence ratione loci: the geographic scope of the investigation is human
rights violations allegedly committed on the territory of Eritrea, without any
exclusion of a specific area of the country and including the border zones and
Eritrean maritime territory.
Competence ratione temporis: the temporal scope of the investigation covers
the period from the independence of Eritrea until present day.
Competence ratione materiae: the Commission shall investigate the human
rights violations ‘as outlined in the reports of the Special Rapporteur’, which
‘include but are not limited to’:
Extrajudicial killings
Enforced disappearances and incommunicado detention
Arbitrary arrest and detentions
Torture
Violations occurring during compulsory national service, including those affect-
ing children’s rights
Restrictions to freedoms of expression and opinion, assembly, association, reli-
gious belief and movement.44
The COIE did not justify or explain this interpretation of the mandate, but the
specific interpretive choices of the COIE deviated from the practice of other com-
missions. Comparative analysis with others indicates that the COIE’s construction of
its mandate was relatively restrictive on various counts, particularly in relation to its
personal and substantive jurisdiction. Indeed, the COIE adhered to traditional, state-
oriented standards, focusing exclusively on state officials and human rights law
proper. Some COIs have exhibited a more flexible approach whereby the circumstan-
ces and conditions in which they were placed to operate have informed the construc-
tion of their mandate. For instance, the Libya and Syria COIs justified reading
international humanitarian law into their human rights-oriented mandate by refer-
ence to the ongoing armed conflict.45 This allowed those commissions to engage
43 UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/24 (14 July 2014), para. 8.
44 UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), para. 10.
45 ‘The Libya Commission of Inquiry,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/17/44 (1 June 2011), para. 4; ‘Syria Commission
of Inquiry,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (16 August 2012), para. 12.
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with areas of law beyond human rights law and to scrutinize a range of nonstate
actors. In contrast, the COIE noted that the ‘no war, no peace’ term proffered by the
PFDJ as a justification for human rights violations46 had no legal status and that,
apart from concrete timeframes and concrete situations such as unreleased prisoners
of war, international humanitarian law did not apply.47 Another example of strict in-
terpretation by the COIE concerned its decision not to read international criminal
law into its first mandate,48 in contrast to the practice of many other commissions.49
Ultimately, the COIE alluded in its first report to the possibility that crimes against
humanity had been committed, inviting an express second mandate on this.50 The
COIE made explicit findings on crimes against humanity only after having been dir-
ectly invited to do so.51
While taking a restrictive approach to the ratione personae and materiae dimensions
of its mandate, the COIE took a broad approach to the temporal scope of its mandate,
dating it back to the moment of de facto independence in 1991. Although many COIs
are given narrower timeframes in their mandates,52 unlimited temporal mandates are
not uncommon and the COIE’s approach was thus not out of tune with general prac-
tice.53 In turn, the geographical scope of the mandate was literally interpreted and con-
fined to the situation within Eritrea itself, excluding consideration of the government’s
extraterritorial activities. In contrast, the North Korea Commission of Inquiry explicitly
extended its mandate to covering violations involving extraterritorial action, such as
abductions, provided they were attributable to the state.54
46 Referring to the lingering discord with its neighbouring states, Eritrea claimed a ‘no war, no peace’ status
to justify derogations from its human rights obligations and restrictions on persons under its jurisdiction.
UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), para. 55.
47 UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.1 (8 June 2016), para. 190, and specifically fn. 257.
48 UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), para. 11.
49 See, e.g., C. Harwood, ‘Human Rights in Fancy Dress? The Use of International Criminal Law by Human
Rights Council Commissions of Inquiry in Pursuit of Accountability,’ Japanese Yearbook of International
Law 58 (2015): 71–100.
50 For a critique of the Commission’s hesitance, see, Mekonnen, supra n 17.
51 At the COIE’s extension, the UNHRC further specified its mandate, requesting the Commission to ‘in-
vestigate systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights in Eritrea with a view to ensuring
full accountability, including where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity.’ See, UN
Doc. A/HRC/RES/29/18 (22 July 2015), para. 10. This mandate is patterned upon the COIE’s finding
of systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights in its first report.
52 For example, the Central African Republic COI had the mandate to investigate violations since January
2013. UN Doc. S/RES/2127 (5 December 2013), para. 24. The mandate of the Sri Lanka Panel of
Experts was less clear-cut, referring to ‘final stages of the war,’ which the Panel interpreted as ranging
from September 2008 to May 2009. ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on
Accountability in Sri Lanka’ (31 March 2011), paras. 12–13.
53 See, e.g., ‘Report North Korea Commission of Inquiry,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (7 February 2014),
para. 7. The Libya COI also interpreted its mandate as being without temporal limitation. UN Doc.
A/HRC/17/44, para. 4.
54 UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63, para. 8. Yet, a subsequent UNHRC resolution establishing a group of experts
to explore accountability options focused more exclusively on human rights violations in North Korea,
thus leaving claims of North Korean policies to export its own citizens to work as slaves extraterritorially
unaddressed. Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 23 March 2016. ‘Situation of Human
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/31/18 (8 April 2016). For
more on this North Korean slavery practice, see, R. Breuker, ‘Slaves to the System: Researching North
Korean Forced Labor in the EU,’ Leiden Asia Centre (6 July 2016).
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From a diasporic perspective, the COIE’s limited territorial focus was striking.
Although illicit diaspora tax practices had been extensively documented by the UN
Security Council Sanctions Monitoring Group,55 and while violations of human rights
obligations in connection with the diaspora tax had been strongly condemned in the
resolutions establishing the mandates of the special rapporteur and the COIE, the
Commission’s restrictive geographical reading did not allow it to scrutinize those practi-
ces and address them with human rights vocabulary. The restrictive interpretation also
left Sinai trafficking outside the COIE’s purview, despite the Security Council Sanctions
Monitoring Group’s observation that this practice was so pervasive that the state had to
be involved.56 The COIE offered a few observations on these practices, despite its own
construction of the mandate,57 but, generally, the territorially limited mandate meant
that the COIE did not address the diaspora as a subject of protection in its own right.
Instead, the diaspora was approached instrumentally as a source of information.
D I A S P O R A A S I N F O R M A T I O N P R O V I D E R : E R I T R E A ’ S L O N G
A R M E X P O S E D
As with the special rapporteur, the COIE did not gain access to Eritrea,58 and reliable
data concerning the demographics, economy and development of Eritrea are either
in short supply, fabricated or subject to factual dispute. Instead, the COIE gathered
witness testimonies from Eritreans residing in third countries. The COIE delivered
its reports in June 2015 and June 2016.59 Based on the confidential first-hand testi-
mony of 550 interviewees outside Eritrea, 160 written submissions, and other infor-
mation (including satellite imagery) provided by the UN and other entities, the
COIE made findings in its first report of systematic, widespread and gross human
rights violations committed in Eritrea since 1991.60 The second report presented the
finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity
had been committed and were ongoing and it offered recommendations aimed at
ensuring accountability.
For reasons of safety, the COIE excluded the names and other identifying details
of interviewees from the report.61 The COIE noted:
Almost all victims and witnesses in contact with the Commission feared repri-
sals by Eritrean authorities, be it against themselves or targeting their family
55 After Eritrea invaded Djibouti in 2008, and following the determination that Eritrean actions to militarily
support Al-Shabaab in Somalia had destabilized the region, the UN Security Council imposed an arms
embargo and extended the Somali sanctions regime and the role of the Sanctions Monitoring Group to
Eritrean political and military leadership. UN Doc. S/RES/1907 (23 December 2009), para. 15.
56 UN Doc. S/2011/433 (18 July 2011), para. 421.
57 On the involvement of Eritrean nationals in Sinai trafficking, see, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June
2015), para. 155. On Eritrea’s treatment of people in the diaspora, see, paras. 348–351 and 440–442 in
the same document.
58 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/HRC/32/47 (9 June 2016), para. 4.
59 ‘Reports of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea,’ UN Docs. A/HRC/29/42 (4 June
2015) and A/HRC/32/47 (9 May 2016). Also see, UN Docs. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015) and
A/HRC/32/CRP.1 (8 June 2016).
60 UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), summary.
61 Ibid., paras. 29, 30.
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members still living in Eritrea. Irrespective of the country or location where
the interviews were organized, the persons who agreed to speak on a confiden-
tial basis to the Commission were convinced that the Eritrean authorities were
in a position to monitor their conduct through a network of spies and inform-
ants within the Eritrean diaspora. Indeed, the Commission was able to witness
one specific episode of such monitoring.62
In its report, the Commission described the efforts it took to ensure that it was
able to consider a wide range of submissions, including from survivors of gender-
based violence. The difficulty of collecting material and protecting witnesses was rec-
ognized by the Commission, which found it necessary to keep all names of submis-
sions confidential in order to protect victims and witnesses from intimidation.63 As
the Commission’s chairman Mike Smith stated at the presentation of the second re-
port, diaspora communities were living in continuous fear.64
In the run-up to the second report, and following its own call to submit informa-
tion or documentation, the Commission received approximately 45,000 submissions
by mail and email. The bulk of this very high number of submissions was critical of
the Commission’s first report. The COIE lacked the necessary resources to contact
each individual who had filed a written submission, so instead designed a method-
ology to test the authenticity of submissions, to inquire whether those who made
submissions had read the first report, and to learn about their motivation for writing.
The procedure of direct engagement with the witness submissions was detailed in
the second report, but basically involved contacting a sample of 500 individuals from
16 different countries.65
These follow-up efforts resulted in a number of findings. First, the Commission
found that those who voiced the most fervent criticism of its first report were
Eritreans who had left the country before or immediately after 1991, as well as their
relatives – thus first-wave migrants and their offspring.66 Yet petitioners who were
critical of the first report also included Eritrean guest workers without dual national-
ity and in need of a valid Eritrean passport for visa renewal – and thus dependent on
Eritrean consular services. These petitioners told the Commission that writing in
support of the government had been set as a precondition for passport renewal.67
Secondly, many of the petitioners contacted admitted that they had not read the re-
port and some were even unaware they had signed a petition.68 The similarities in a
great number of the submissions suggested a well-organized campaign by the govern-
ment and pro-government diasporic groups to discredit the inquiry, as also expressly
noted by the COIE chairman upon presentation of the second report.69 Leaked
62 Ibid., para. 27.
63 UN Doc. A/HRC/32/47 (9 June 2016), para. 13.
64 ‘Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea – Press Conference,’ UN Web TV, 8 June 2016, http://webtv.un.org/
watch/commission-of-inquiry-on-eritrea-press-conference-geneva-8-june-2016/4930296361001 (accessed
19 August 2019).
65 UN Doc. A/HRC/32/47 (9 June 2016), paras. 16–22.
66 Ibid., para. 19.
67 Ibid., para. 20.
68 Ibid.
69 ‘Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea,’ supra n 64.
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documents posted on the internet70 later confirmed the existence of a government
strategy in which fabricated witness forms stating that no human rights violations
had occurred in Eritrea were distributed to members of the diaspora through embas-
sies, intimidating door-to-door visits and gatherings, and Facebook accounts, com-
bined with coercive Paltalk videos.71
The COIE’s engagement with the Eritrean diaspora clearly highlights how fault
lines in diaspora communities may play out. It also underscores that COI outreach
to diaspora groups may provoke uncooperative states to become more openly ob-
structive, relying on broader authoritarian governance modalities in deterritorialized
spaces.72
R E C E P T I O N A N D F O L L O W - U P : T E S T I N G T H E P O T E N T I A L A N D
L I M I T S O F D I A S P O R A M O B I L I Z A T I O N
The COIE presented its reports to its parent body, the UNHRC, but its recommen-
dations were also addressed to Eritrea, as the state under scrutiny, as well as to the
UN member states, thus including host states of the Eritrean diaspora. Host states
were specifically requested to shield interviewees from Eritrea’s network of spies and
informants and to implement protective measures.73 In addition to home and host
states, the COIE addressed other actors as well. Even transnational corporations
operating in Eritrea were given concrete recommendations as they were advised to
conduct human rights assessments to verify that they were not using conscript la-
bour. In line with the blind spot identified above, the diaspora as such was not men-
tioned in the COIE’s recommendations.
This section chronicles how the COIE reports were received by the various stake-
holders involved and how this got meshed into broader strategic interests. This high-
lights that effective sequels are sometimes better sought at the domestic plane,
including through domestic courts, using the energy present in diaspora commun-
ities as driving forces. Yet, as will be discussed, there are also limits to diasporic inter-
ventions flowing from the particular qualities of diaspora communities.
International Politics and a Window of Opportunity
A window of opportunity or ‘policy window’ is a moment in time with a beginning
and end when new points can be added to a policy agenda and when new ideas can
emerge within the political process.74 A COI may open a policy window and could
be evaluated in terms of its influence in putting new ideas onto the policy agenda.
70 On a Facebook page called SACTISM. Also see, M. Plaut, ‘Eritrea: The Battle for International Opinion,’
16 May 2016, https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2016/05/16/eritrea-the-battle-for-international-opinion/
(accessed 19 August 2019).
71 Paltalk is said to be the largest video chat room community. For a discussion on how Paltalk videos were
used in the context of the COIE process, see, S. Höfner and Z. Tewolde-Berhan, ‘Crimes against
Humanity: The Commission of Inquiry Reports on Eritrea,’ in Ongoing Vulnerability of Refugees from
Eritrea: A Crisis of Accountability, ed. M. van Reisen and M. Mawere, EEPA Report (2016).
72 Bozzini, supra n 32.
73 UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.1 (5 June 2015), paras. 27–28.
74 The concept of the ‘policy window’ was first launched by John Kingdon in Agendas, Alternatives and
Public Policies (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2014[1984]). The ‘policy window’ was examined as a tool to
understand processes of history making changes in international relations by Mirjam van Reisen, Window
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The reception of the COIE report in policy circles, and in particular at the European
Union (EU) as a host of many Eritreans, is analyzed from this perspective in this
subsection.
Eritrea’s stance towards the COIE and the reception of its report was straightfor-
ward. In conformity with the mainstream attitude of states under UNHRC scrutiny,
Eritrea tried to fend off the COIE and offered only minimal cooperation, as it had also
done with the special rapporteur and, perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, with the
Security Council Sanctions Monitoring Group. Yet, it was keenly aware of the process.
From the outset, it rejected the COIE, as well as the special rapporteur, and held that
these ‘duplicate mandate holders’ were ‘extra-procedurally appointed,’75 thus raising a
general objection to country-specific mandates. In response to the first report, Eritrea
specifically opposed the COIE’s methodology, particularly its broad interpretation of
the temporal scope of its mandate,76 a standard of proof that it deemed too low,77 and
the reliance on anonymous witness testimony from asylum seekers who had an interest
in ‘hyperbolic accounts of persecution from repression.’78
In the face of the regime’s efforts to discredit the COIE, segments of the diaspora
opposed to the government attempted to capitalize on the COIE process, using it as
an instrument to influence policy in different circles. Hence, as the EU considered
resuming its donor and development programmes for Eritrea in March 2015, with a
view also to curbing the Eritrean exodus, diaspora actors and Eritrea experts issued a
statement requesting the European Commission to put its preparations for an aid
package to the Eritrean government on hold ‘until such time that the UN
Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea has been given full and unfettered access to
Eritrea so that it can carry out its investigation and has presented its conclusions.’79
Subsequent to these developments, the second COIE report came out in June
2016. It was more forceful in its findings and recommendations: it concluded that
crimes against humanity had been committed, it compiled files with data on suspects,
and it made several recommendations regarding accountability mechanisms. In par-
ticular, the recommendation that the Security Council refer the situation in Eritrea
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) was championed by members of the vic-
tim diaspora.80 Yet, the COIE recommendations did not effectuate political action in
more formal circles.81 The UNHRC only ‘requested’ the General Assembly to share
the report with relevant UN organs for consideration and appropriate action, without
explicitly mentioning or endorsing the ICC referral recommendation.82 In its
of Opportunity: EU Development Cooperation after the End of the Cold War (Trenton, NJ: Africa World
Press, 2009).
75 Eritrea, Ministry of Information, ‘Commission of Inquiry Report: Devoid of Credibility and Substance’
(19 June 2015), paras. 1 and 3. See also, Eritrea, Ministry of Information, ‘Commission of Inquiry
Report: Cynical Political Travesty that Undermines Human Rights’ (11 June 2015).
76 Eritrea, Ministry of Information, 19 June 2015, supra n 75 at para. 4.
77 Ibid., para. 5.
78 Ibid., para. 6.
79 A. Arnone & Others, ‘Statement on EU Asylum and Aid Policy to Eritrea’ (31 March 2015).
80 See, for example, the Stop Slavery in Eritrea Campaign on Facebook.
81 See also Mekonnen, supra n 17, who argues that the diplomatic milieu in 2016 was less favourable than
in 2015.
82 ‘Situation of Human Rights in Eritrea,’ Resolution 32/24, UN Doc. A/71/53 (1 July 2016), para. 17. In
comparison, the UNHRC and General Assembly resolutions regarding North Korea were more
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Statement at the Interactive Dialogue of the General Assembly Third Committee,
Eritrea subsequently stated that it no longer wanted to enter into a debate and mere-
ly insisted that the COI had ceased to exist. It translated the UNHRC’s mild recep-
tion of the report as follows:
The Council had considered the report, took note of it and decided to reject
its key recommendations, which included astonishingly sending yet another
African country, Eritrea, to the International Criminal Court.83
On 28 January 2016, several months before publication of the second COIE re-
port, the EU and Eritrea signed a National Indicative Programme for investment and
aid of US$200 million.84 The programme was supported by the European
Parliament, which mainly emphasized the requirement that the recommendations of
the Universal Periodic Review processes be implemented, while access for the COI
was mentioned in passing, but rather obliquely at that point in time.85 The European
Parliament’s tepid statement evidences that the momentum from June 2015 had al-
ready dissipated and, despite the COIE’s explicit conclusions in June 2016 that
crimes against humanity were being committed, the EU Emergency Trust Fund
adopted project proposals in December 2016 involving new development aid
packages.86
In response to these developments, the special rapporteur observed in her 2017
report that,
The Special Rapporteur takes note of EU efforts to respond to the migration
influx, but is concerned about an approach that appears to focus predominant-
ly on external border protection and increased return rates. She stresses that
any effort to curb the flow of refugees from Eritrea should not come at the ex-
pense of addressing the root causes of ongoing human rights violations in the
country, which are the real drivers of forced migration from Eritrea.87
The special rapporteur also noted that, ‘for reasons unrelated to the human rights
situation in Eritrea, it is unlikely that a referral to the International Criminal Court is
an imminent option.’88 She thus proposed exploring alternative accountability ave-
nues, such as the exercise of universal jurisdiction by domestic courts.89 The special
straightforward, and explicitly encouraged a follow up to the ICC referral recommendation, e.g., UNHRC
Resolution 28/22, UN Doc. A/70/53 (27 March 2015), para. 6 and General Assembly Resolution 69/
188.
83 Statement by Yemane Ghebreab, adviser to the president, at the Interactive Dialogue, UN General
Assembly, Third Committee, New York, 27 October 2016.
84 Eritrea–EU Cooperation, 11th European Development Fund, National Indicative Programme 2014–
2020, signed in Asmara, 28 January 2016.
85 European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2016 on the situation in Eritrea (2016/2568(RSP)), paras.
6 and 10.
86 European Commission, International Cooperation and Development, ‘Support for the Creation of
Employment Opportunities and Skills Development in Eritrea,’ 22 December 2016.
87 UN Doc. A/HRC/35/39 (7 June 2017), para. 35.
88 Ibid., para. 64.
89 Ibid., para. 67.
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rapporteur acknowledged that effective use of this option depended, inter alia, on
the availability of evidence and observed that civil society could play a role in collect-
ing documentation.90 In addition, she indicated that civil society actors were crucial
in generating and maintaining the political will needed for such actions.91 In a subse-
quent resolution adopted in July 2017, the European Parliament stressed the need
for accountability on the conclusions of the COIE and expressed support for the spe-
cial rapporteur, but it did not reiterate the rapporteur’s suggestions about the exercise
of universal jurisdiction.92
At the international political level broader strategic interests, including those of
host states to curb migration flows, have thus to some extent outweighed the con-
cerns expressed in the COIE reports and the framing of the situation in international
criminal law terms. The search for accountability mechanisms, then, refocused and
shifted to the domestic level, thereby clearly envisaging a role for civil society actors,
possibly in tandem with diaspora communities.
Domestic Courts and Transnational Justice and Protection Strategies
The use of universal jurisdiction as a transnational justice strategy and the particular
role of victim diasporas as central dynamos of these processes has been theorized by
Frédéric Mégret.93 He articulates a diasporic model of universal jurisdiction as a
form of rooted cosmopolitanism and he normatively grounds this model in a duty of
hospitality of the host state coupled with a transnational right to remedy for victims.
Mégret invites us to see universal jurisdiction as a sociolegal practice and to study it
‘from the ground up.’ In the specific context of our analysis, several Eritrean organi-
zations can be identified that have the express aim to contribute to accountability.
Most prominently, the Eritrean Law Society (ELS) seeks to investigate and assess
human rights violations against Eritreans, specifically including Eritreans outside
Eritrea, and subsequently to lobby governments and organizations to pay attention
to those violations.94 The ELS website announces collaboration with the NGO
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) to jointly develop
strategies aimed at triggering universal jurisdiction processes in European states.95
These initiatives correspond with the call of the special rapporteur to refocus on the
potential of universal jurisdiction as the avenue for accountability with most current
potential. So far, no universal jurisdiction cases have materialized. The usefulness of
the COIE process and its findings for achieving justice and protection of the Eritrean
victim diaspora has been tested though, through different domestic procedures.
The COIE reports have, for instance, been invoked by asylum seekers to corrob-
orate claims regarding the risks involved in forcible return. However, this has not
90 Ibid., para. 73.
91 Ibid., para. 74.
92 European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2017 on Eritrea, notably the cases of Abune Antonios and
Dawit Isaak (2017/2755(RSP)). The European Parliament did address the tension between its calls for
accountability and the EU’s support for the aid package, as it ‘Denounced the resumption of major EU
aid to Eritrea and in particular the signing off of the NIP for Eritrea of EUR 200 million,’ para. 10.
93 Mégret, supra n 9.
94 See, www.erilaw.org/.
95 Notice on website of 15 September 2018, ‘ELS and ECCHR Exploring Possible Areas of Collaboration.’
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been entirely successful. In the asylum case between MST, MYK, AA and the
Secretary of State for the Home Department, the UK dismissed the relevance of the
reports for this procedure. The Upper Tribunal summarized the critique as follows:
The respondent’s main criticisms in full are that: (i) the overbroad temporal
scope renders the report’s methodology ‘entirely opaque’; (ii) the Commission
does not set out how the interviewees were selected or what steps were taken
to protect against interview bias; (iii) the Commission does not explain what
percentage of respondents were asylum seekers and does not grapple with the
issue of whether the evidence of asylum seekers can always be taken at face-
value; (iv) the Commission does not give any detail about the nature and
methodology of the questioning, who carried out the interviews, whether the
questions were open or closed; or whether interlocutors were alone or not; (v)
it is not clear how written submissions were checked or verified – only selected
extracts of interviews were made available and there is use of paraphrase; (vi)
the vast majority of propositions are supported by very few sources.96
The Tribunal did not make a definitive finding about the validity of these cri-
tiques. It just pointed out that its own task was very different from that of the COIE.
It stated:
we are not tasked with deciding on the nature and extent of human rights vio-
lations in that country over a 25 year period and it would be arrogant in the ex-
treme for a domestic tribunal dealing with a country guidance case focusing on
risk of forcible return to try and pass judgement on a large-scale international
inquiry which has taken several years and involved a prodigious amount of
work. On the other hand, we cannot avoid identifying certain difficulties posed
by these two reports that impinge on our own task and we agree with the re-
spondent that we cannot apply different standards from that we apply to e.g.
government Fact-Finding Missions, just because the report is carried out by
UN officials.97
Hence, the Tribunal questioned whether the COIE had applied ‘rigorous stand-
ards,’ as asserted, and regretted the lack of further context regarding methodology.98
Nonetheless, the Tribunal did conclude that Eritreans who had left illegally or were
likely to be perceived upon return as draft evaders or deserters would face a risk of
persecution.99 The concerns about methodology did not prevent some degree of reli-
ance on the report,100 but they do indicate that the low level of methodological
96 UK, Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), MST and Others (national service – risk cat-
egories) Eritrea CG [2016] UKUT 00443 (IAC), Between MST, MYK, AA and The Secretary of State
for the Home Department, and UNHCR intervening, June 2016, para. 210.
97 Ibid., para. 214.
98 Ibid., para. 216; for example, as regards matters such as whether questions were open or closed, and
whether anyone else was present during the interviews.
99 Ibid., para. 431.
100 As also noted by the special rapporteur. UN Doc. A/HRC/35/39 (7 June 2017), para. 39.
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rigour (or perceptions of it) may limit the report’s influence in domestic judicial or
administrative settings.
Somewhat similar evidentiary reservations informed a very different type of legal
case in Canada – the action against Canadian mining company Nevsun. This case
came before the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada, pursuant to a civil
claim brought by members of the Eritrean diaspora. For purposes of addressing
forum non conveniens and non-justiciability applications brought by Nevsun, the
Court had to decide whether various reports on the situation in Eritrea, including
the COIE reports, but also state and NGO reports, were admissible as evidence.101
Analyzing previous cases in which Canadian courts referred to governmental, NGO
and UN reports, the Court pointed out that the weight given to such reports
depended on ‘the context of the proceeding, including the type of hearing, and the
circumstances of the individual case.’102 Nonetheless, distinguishing between ‘social
facts’ and ‘adjudicative facts,’103 the various reports – including the COIE report –
were admitted, but only for the limited purpose of offering a social, historical and
contextual framework in which first-hand evidence could be assessed.104
Subsequently, the Supreme Court concluded that there was a real risk of an unfair
trial in Eritrea, basing its assessment on the secondary reports, but not singling out
the COIE reports.105 The case was allowed to proceed to trial.
In these cases, the UN signature on the COIE reports did not offer special status
and the COIE reports were treated on a par with NGO and other reports, while the
authority such reports had depended mainly on their methodological rigour. In this
respect, the courts, and in particular the UK court, noted the complexities inherent
in the reliance on testimonies from individuals that have fled their state. The broad
timeframe of the COIE, spanning over 25 years, also diminished the possibility for
individuals in the diaspora to usefully rely on them in subsequent litigation, an elem-
ent that the COIE probably did not sufficiently appreciate while interpreting its
mandate.
C O I s A S O P P O R T U N I T Y S T R U C T U R E S F O R D I A S P O R A S 1 0 6
The dissonance between the COIE’s interpretation of its mandate and concrete dias-
pora interests reinforces the suggestion made at the outset of this article that COIs
do not typically regard diasporas as relevant interlocutors beyond their instrumental
role as information providers. The North Korea COI may have been an exception in
that it organized public hearings in cities with large diaspora communities, but
101 Canada, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Araya v. Nevsun Resources Ltd., 2016 BCSC 1856 (6
October 2016), para. 8.
102 Ibid., para. 165.
103 ‘Social facts’ are ‘used to construct a frame of reference or background for deciding factual issues crucial
to the resolution of a particular case’; they are general in nature. In turn, ‘adjudicative facts’ encompass
‘the where, when and why of the accused is alleged to have done.’ Araya v. Nevsun, supra n 101 at para.
169, referring to Isakhani v. Al-Saggaf, 2007 ONCA 539, para. 38.
104 Ibid., para. 138.
105 Ibid., para. 296.
106 The term ‘opportunity structure’ is borrowed from Orjuela, supra n 7.
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diasporas certainly do not feature prominently on the radar of commissions, or of
international law scholars more broadly for that matter.
Yet, many states subjected to international human rights inquiries will have gener-
ated significant diasporas. Since the composition and relation of these diaspora com-
munities to the home state will vary, the aim of this article and the Eritrean case study
has not been to make generic claims on diasporas and COIs. Rather, this article was
informed by a more modest ambition, namely to set the stage for some deeper reflec-
tion on COIs as opportunity structures for diasporas and to expose how the current
international architecture may be inapt to capture present-day diasporic realities.
The Eritrean case study quite pertinently elucidates why international lawyers have
difficulty with this concept and why diasporas are not easily conceptualized as subjects
in a legal sense. As is the case with most diasporas, the Eritrean diaspora is not mono-
lithic at all and as a result of this very heterogeneity diasporas may well be too elusive
for any type of traditional legal recognition.107 Indeed, the argument has been made in
other disciplines that we should not think of diasporas ‘in substantialist terms as a
bounded entity but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim.’108 Lawyers may well have dif-
ficulty grappling with such intangible constructs. Diasporas thus challenge international
law’s reflex to engage with entities and phenomena through a subject-based approach
only. They also test international law’s underlying territorial assumptions.
Indeed, the COIE case study is spot on in its illustration of how the structures of
human rights law are rather ill-equipped to offer protection to diasporas. While the long-
arm practices of the Eritrean government, including allegedly the Sinai trafficking, clearly
evoke questions regarding the need for human rights protection of diasporas against
home state actors, the COIE chose to largely ignore this exercise of transnational author-
ity. Why did the COIE not pierce the diaspora phenomenon to embrace the individual
diaspora member as a subject of its inquiry? Most likely, the COIE refrained from add-
ing a broad extraterritorial dimension to its mandate because it was blinkered by human
rights’ more traditional parameters. As a result, Asmara’s long-arm practices largely
remained unscrutinized. While in line with prevalent understandings of human rights
law, the COIE approach left victims in the diaspora wanting. On a deeper level, the
omission highlights that human rights law’s territorial starting point and its subject-based
approach may be ever more out of tune with the pace and configuration of our present
globalized world. Acts such as those scrutinized by COIs often do not occur in one place
only. The Sinai trafficking, for example, is marked by ransom kidnapping and extortion
of family members who are located in other territories than the direct victims.109
Moreover, as observed by Mégret, when victims travel (or flee), their harm travels with
them.110 Ignoring those victims in diasporas leaves certain facts unreported.
107 L. van den Herik, ‘Diasporas and International Law,’ ESIL Reflections 7(6) (2018).
108 R.W. Brubaker, ‘The “Diaspora” Diaspora,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 28(1) (2005): 12, as affirmatively
quoted by R. Bauböck, ‘Cold Constellations and Hot Identities: Political Theory Questions about
Transnationalism and Diaspora,’ in Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods, ed.
R. Bauböck and T. Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010).
109 Yehuda Goor, ‘Ransom Kidnapping and Human Trafficking: The Case of the Sinai Torture Camps,’
Berkeley Journal of International Law 36(1) (2018): 111–165.
110 Mégret, supra n 9.
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Apart from highlighting these structural discords, the article aimed to deepen and
broaden perspectives on which roles diasporas can and do play in COI contexts. Thus
far, COIs have mostly approached members of diaspora communities instrumentally,
for information-gathering purposes. By lack of territorial access, this method may bring
a COI as close to the ‘crime scene’ as it can get. While diasporas are immensely useful
as information providers, the COIE also exhibited the extremely complex nature of dia-
sporas and their intensely political nature, raising the question of how this impacts on
the suitability of individuals in diasporas to function as information providers. As is
commonly the case with diasporas, Eritreans abroad vary in their stance towards
‘home’ and may entertain positive, sceptical or hostile relations to their home state.111
Obviously, this also informed their attitude towards the human rights inquiry. The
COIE experience revealed how contestations impacted both the process of fact-finding
as well as the reception of outcomes. More generally, it has been observed that diaspo-
ras have a past-oriented identity that can become frozen in time and which is very
much tied to a vision of the homeland at a specific point in time, namely the moment
of departure.112 These features do not render diaspora members unsuitable as informa-
tion providers per se, but they should inform methods of fact-finding. The two domes-
tic cases which were discussed revealed how methodological choices and restraints
may influence domestic reception and how overreliance on diasporic voices may weak-
en findings if not properly embedded in a broader corroborative methodology.
The two cases were also presented as examples of transnational justice and protec-
tion strategies at the domestic level, tying in with another role that diasporas can play
and which could be further enhanced, namely as mobilizers of legal action. The energy
that flows from the intrinsic political engagement of diasporas can ensure active follow
up of COI outcomes, if channelled properly. For instance, diasporas can play key roles
in triggering the exercise of universal jurisdiction.113 The two cases also offer a glimpse
of broader protection and accountability possibilities at the domestic level, although ad-
mittedly universal jurisdiction remains the most obvious entry point for this. As inter-
national inquiry outcomes may often not produce the desired international response,
domestic strategies must be pursued by default. In domestic settings, recognizing rele-
vant migrant groups as diasporas better appreciates their inherent mobilizing force.114
This insight can be extrapolated to the other roles too. In conclusion, it is thus submit-
ted that recognition of the different roles that diasporas can play as well as appreciating
their specific diasporic condition may help COIs evolve as more effective instruments
in the contemporary world.
111 For a similar categorization in relation to the Rwanda diaspora, see, Orjuela, supra n 7, referring to S.
Turner, ‘Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance,’ African Studies 72(2) (2013):
265–284.
112 Koinova, supra n 7.
113 H. Haider, ‘Transnational Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: The Participation of Conflict-
Generated Diasporas in Addressing the Legacy of Mass Violence,’ Journal of Refugee Studies 27(2)
(2014): 207–233.
114 Bauböck, supra n 108, argues that diasporas must be understood as a political project and that this
understanding differentiates diasporas from general transnational migrant communities. Bauböck also
notes the performative quality that has been ascribed to the term, as well as the focus on politics of pas-
sion that the concept entails.
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